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CASE NOTES
through some fortuity such as wealth, habitual contact with the law, or intelli-
gence, retain counsel either before or immediately after arrest.
The dissenting opinions unfortunately do not refer to one remarkably com-
pelling argument with which the Court was faced in this case: that is, had the
police officers not unlawfully delayed arraignment, 32 the conviction would have
been summarily reversed on the authority of the post-arraignment right-to-
counsel rule of People v. Meyer 33 This irony must have called irresistably for
reversal, but the Court, in so doing, has perhaps extended its ruling farther than
conscience required. It would be sufficient to confer a right of counsel only where
there has been an unlawful delay in arraignment.34 If the Court has indeed so
ruled, the conflict with efficient law enforcement which the dissenting judges
foresee in their more liberal interpretation of the case,35 would be moderated some.
Yet this narrower holding does not alter the tendency of the present rule to favor
persons with ready access to counsel over those with limited access. Said differ-
ently, the rule favors grand scale crime over petty crime, and this, of course, is an
undesirable result. The three possible defects of the present rule (inequality of
application, favoritism of large scale crime, and unnecessary interference with
law enforcement) should evoke some reconsideration.
James B. Denman
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY-PROCEEDS OF FIRE INSURANCE
POLICY ON REAL PROPERTY HELD BY THE ENTIRETY MAY BE DMDED AS OF
RIGHT.
Husband and wife were owners as tenants by the entirety of real property
with improvements thereon. A dwelling house, covered by a fire insurance policy
owned and held by them, was totally destroyed by fire. Upon execution of notice
of claim by the owners the insurance company issued a draft payable to hus-
band, wife, and another who was mortgagee of the property. Husband, who had
been separated from the wife for some time, refused to endorse the draft. Upon
wife's action for injunctive and other relief, husband moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the proceeds were impressed with the same quality of inseverability
as the estate they replaced. The Supreme Court granted the motion,' which
was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. The
Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting without opinion, reversed; held, the
proceeds of a standard fire insurance are personal property which may be divided
upon demand regardless of the nature of the estate they replace. Hawthorne v.
Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192 N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1963).
32. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 165; N.Y. Penal Law § 1844.
33. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962). See Brief for Appellant,
p. 37.
34. See note 28 supra.
35. Instant case at 159, 193 N.E.2d at 634, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
1. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 24 Misc. 2d 508, 208 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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Tenancy by the entirety is a joint estate in lands peculiar to the husband
and wife relationship. It arose in the common law out of the unity of identity
of a husband and wife.2 Today, perhaps the most important incident of this
estate is its inseverability. In general, it may be severed only by the joint act of
the husband and wife, or by a dissolution of the marriage.8 Although one of the
tenants may sell his interest in the lands, 4 the purchaser takes as tenant in
common with the spouse subject to her right of survivorship and partition cannot
be compelled. 5 What result should follow when the real property is replaced by
personal property under circumstances beyond the control of the owners presents
problems which the courts have resolved in various ways.
As a general rule in New York, personal property cannot be held by the
entirety.6 Nonetheless, the proposition has been advanced and discussed in opin-
ions, but usually as dictum.7 The cases raising the issue generally fall into one
of two categories: damage awards in condemnation proceedings, and equity of
redemption following mortgage foreclosure sales. Other cases include bonds and
mortgages taken upon sale of lands held by the entirety and joint bank accounts
and investments held jointly. In the condemnation cases the courts have been
quite consistent in holding that the awards stood in the place of the lands. The
earlier cases so held as to the rights of mortgagees,8 which, of course, had nothing
to do with tenancy by the entirety, but formed the basis for holding in a later
case that the incident of survivorship would obtain if the condemned property
was held by the entirety. 9 The equity of redemption cases similarly follow this
rule;' 0 however, the basic concern of the courts in these cases is the protection
of the spouse's right of survivorship.11 The other cases are somewhat in conflict,
but the weight of authority favors the rule that personalty cannot be held by the
entirety.' 2 The main support for a contrary holding is the common law pre-
sumption that the husband owned all of the wife's personalty; therefore, when
he attempted to pass an interest to her, his intent must have been to give her
2. See generally Note, Tenancies by the Entirety in New York, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 279
(1952).
3. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 56; Stelz v. Schreck, 128 N.Y. 263, 28 N.E. 510 (1891);
Finnegan v. Humes, 163 Misc. 840, 298 N.Y. Supp. 50 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
4. Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895).
5. Bartkowaik v. Sampson, 73 Misc. 446, 133 N.Y. Supp. 401 (Oneida County Ct. 1911).
6. In the Matter of Albrecht, 136 N.Y. 91, 32 N.E. 632 (1892); Matter of McKelway,
221 N.Y. 15, 116 N.E. 348 (1917).
7. See Overheiser v. Lackey, 207 N.Y. 229, 100 N.E. 738 (1913); Goodrich v. Village
of Otego, 216 N.Y. 112, 110 N.E. 162 (1915).
8. Utter v. Richmond, 112 N.Y. 610, 20 N.E. 554 (1889); Bank of Auburn v. Roberts,
44 N.Y. 192 (1870).
9. In the Matter of City of New York (Jamaica Bay), 252 App. Div. 103, 297 N.Y.
Supp. 415 (2d Dep't 1937).
10. Dunning v. Ocean Nat lBank, 61 N.Y. 497 (1875); Germania Say. Bank v. Jung,
28 Abb. N. Cas. 81, 18 N.Y. Supp. 709 (Sup. Ct. 1892). But see Franklin Square Nat'l Bank
v. Schiller, 202 Misc. 576, 119 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
11. Farmer's and Mechanic's Nat'1 Bank v. Gregory, 49 Barb. 155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867).
12. In the Matter of Estate of Blumenthal, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923); Loker
v. Edmans, 204 App. Div. 223, 197 N.Y. Supp. 857 (3d Dep't 1923). Cf. Scutella v. County
Fire Ins. Co., 231 App. Div. 343, 247 N.Y. Supp. 689 (4th Dep't 1931).
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nothing greater than the right of survivorship. 13 Thus, the courts looked to an
intention on the part of the husband to make a gift to his wife upon his death.
This intent, or lack of proof of it, was the means of distinguishing the earlier
cases.14 In view of present-day rights of married women, it would seem that the
presumption would rarely be applied in modern cases.
Commencing with the general proposition that there can be no holding by
the entirety in personal property, the Court found that the fire insurance policy
and the proceeds paid thereunder were personalty.' 5 The dispositive question was
whether equity demanded that the personal property so acquired be ascribed with
the same quality of inseverability as the estate it replaced. Respondent urged,
that since the proceeds were the result of an involuntary conversion this case
was closely analogous to the condemnation cases and the rule in those cases
should be followed. The Court distinguished the instant case from the condem-
nation cases by observing that in the latter cases the forced conversion was
completely involuntary and the loss was the legal source of the new res. In the
case at bar the subject matter of the dispute arose as the result of a purely
voluntary contract and the fruits of that contract should be treated like any
other personal property voluntarily acquired. The Court went further, by way
of dicta, to express dissatisfaction with any rule which would allow personalty
to be held by the entirety. As a matter of policy, the Court felt that a tying-up
of money, as a contrary holding would have required, would be a serious im-
pediment to its enjoyment. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, felt that
preservation of the spouse's right to survivorship overrode other considerations
of policy. Therefore, it readily found this case analogous to those involving con-
demnation and equity of redemption where it was held that an "involuntary
conversion" did not destroy a tenancy by the entirety.
Once, in deciding a case involving an estate held by the entirety, Judge
William S. Andrews remarked, "we appeal to history and not to logic for the
explanation."' 16 Ironically, the lower court in the instant case appealed to both
history and logic to arrive at its conclusion. The close analogies furnished by the
condemnation and equity of redemption cases, together with the proposition that
the basic policy consideration is the preservation of the right of survivorship
makes the reasoning of the lower court seem quite sound. However, the idea that
there can be joint ownership in personalty analogous to a joint estate in lands
has its roots in a dictum from a case where the Court, at best, had joint tenancy,
and not tenancy by the entirety in mind.1 Furthermore, as pointed out in the
instant opinion, the right of survivorship may be illusory. If a joint tenant sells
his interest, his act converts the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common, which
13. West v. McCullough, 123 App. Div. 846, 108 N.Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dep't 1908). But
cf. Matter of Polizzo, 308 N.Y. 517, 127 N.E.2d 316 (1955).
14. In the Matter of Estate of Blumenthal, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923).
15. Brownell v. Board of Educ., 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925); Galante v. Hath-
away Bakeries, Inc., 6 A.D.2d 142, 176 N.Y.S.2d 87 (4th Dep't 1958).
16. Matter of Lyon, 233 N.Y. 208, 210, 135 N.E. 247 (1922).
17. Overheiser v. Lackey, 207 N.Y. 229, 100 N.E. 738 (1913).
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effectively destroys the right of survivorship.' 8 Much of the uncertainty seems
to be due to the doctrine of "equitable conversion," whereby the equity court
can do justice by acting upon the presumed intentions of the parties.'9 This is
not a fixed rule of law, but a mere fiction based on the maxim, "equity regards as
done what ought to be done."20 Viewed in this light the cases take on new mean-
ing, although they lose some of their precedential value. For example, in a case
cited with approval by the Court, a husband and wife were owners as tenants
by the entirety of certain mortgaged real estate which was subsequently fore-
closed. The wife, plaintiff, who had been abandoned and was legally separated
from her defendant husband, had obtained judgments for alimony arrears. The
husband was not within personal jurisdiction of the court. Had the court ruled
the surplus to be inseverable, the wife would have been unable to proceed against
her husband's share. Instead, the court held that the parties held the surplus
as tenants in common.21 In an earlier case under somewhat similar circumstances,
the court came to an opposite conclusion; yet in that case, the judge felt con-
strained to point out that the wife was not being prejudiced by the decision. 22
In the condemnation cases the decisions often operated to secure an equitable
lien on the damage awards in favor of mortgagees of the original land. Thus,
rather than blindly applying a rule of law, the courts used their equitable powers
to effect substantial justice and preserve the rights of parties who might other-
wise be without remedy. Although the Court in this case based its decision upon
fairly narrow grounds, it left little doubt as to the probable outcome of future
cases involving analogous holdings of personalty by the entirety. In the Court's
view, today, real estate is more the subject of commerce and less the object of
possession and use, thereby necessitating changes in judicial thinking about how
owners of property can enjoy it to its fullest extent. Whether the Court will
finally abolish any holdings of personal property by the entirety, or whether it
will distinguish it away as it did in this case, is problematical. It might be sug-
gested that the latter course be adopted in order to preserve it for those cases
where the equities demand that it be applied.
Courtland R. La Vallee
18. In the Matter of Suter, 258 N.Y. 104, 179 N.E. 310 (1932); cf. Loker v. Edmans,
204 App. Div. 223, 197 N.Y. Supp. 857 (3d Dep't 1923).
19. Dunning v. Ocean Nat'1 Bank, 61 N.Y. 497, 503 (1875) (concurring opinion).
20. In the Matter of Maguire, 251 App. Div. 337, 296 N.Y. Supp. 528 (2d Dep't 1937).
21. Franklin Square Nat'I Bank v. Schiller, 202 Misc. 576, 119 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
22. Stretz v. Zolkoski, 118 Misc. 806, 195 N.Y. Supp. 46 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
